HESEKE – It has been nearly a year since the attack by MIT-supported ISIS gangs on Hesekê Prison, where ISIS members are held. Providing information about the investigation launched after the attack, Newroz Ehmed shared the information that the investigation is still ongoing and said, “We carried out an investigation within our means. There are still aspects to consider. Phone numbers of Turkey and many other countries were found in prison. Whoever they belonged to, they should have been followed. Our ability to detect them is limited. We shared this with other forces. There are no desired results. Again, DNA testing was required for the identity of the murdered persons. The seized things, the ISIS members we arrested once again, they are being questioned. “The main aspects and conclusions have been revealed, but there are still some details that need to be uncovered and we are working on this.”
SDF General Command Member Newroz Ehmed shared with the ANF the information revealed in the investigation carried out in the attack on the prison where ISIS detainees are located in Hesekê on January 20, 2022, and many other details.
The first year of the attack on the Sinaa Prison, where ISIS detainees are held, in Hesekê, on January 20, 2022, is coming to an end. What would you like to say? What are the latest results about the attack in the investigation launched into the attack?
A year has passed since the Hesekê attack. Of course, many people were arrested during this process and the attack process. A multi-faceted investigation was launched. At first, this attack was an important investigation that revealed where and how it was carried out. True, some information was coming in advance that there would be an attack. And in this direction, many attack attempts were foiled. We did not anticipate that there would be an attack the size of the last attack. Because many previous attempts to attack had failed.
This attack was organized at the highest level. After the previously blocked attacks, this attack was organized by the top management itself through narrow groups. The top management of ISIS, who remained in the areas under Turkish occupation, organized it. Plans were made by the MIT itself on how to deliver gangs and ammunition to these regions. They went on the attack, calculating the attack in every aspect, in fine detail. It was not just an attack against ISIS and its administration. It was organized by Turkey itself.
THE ATTACK ALSO HAS IRAQ FOOT
The attack also had an Iraqi leg. They aimed to complete this plan by abducting the families of imprisoned ISIS members through the Hol Camp. The plan was based on removing both the detainees and their families together. For this, a broad attack plan was prepared. On the other hand, of course, they had leaked some things in order to communicate with these detainees. They communicated via telephone-like technical equipment. It was determined what the gang members would do in the attack. Cells were also deployed in neighborhoods close to the prison in the city. This indicated that the cells were deployed for a long period of time rather than shortly before the attack.
The people we arrested also admitted how the attacks were planned from the outside. Both those who came from outside and those who were involved in the attack plan admitted this. It was limited to a narrow number. Even all the detainees in the prison did not know. It was a plan of attack that few knew, inside and outside. At the last moment, the attack plan and targets were told to the incoming groups. It has been said how each goal is prepared. In this way, they were sent to our regions. This is how it is organized from the outside.
How did the leaks occur? What has been done about the ‘security gap’ that has been mentioned in many places in the investigation?
That’s right, our forces are keeping it safe. However, the first one; The prison building was unsafe and unsuitable. Many precautions were taken beforehand. Measures were taken against infiltration attempts by digging tunnels around the prison. Many operations were carried out on the intelligence that there were many things inside.
Our forces were trying to increase the measures. We wanted to make this prison, which is the most dangerous, more secure, but we did not have the means. We have taken more security measures around it. Secondly, our technical capabilities are very weak. We have constantly expressed this in our meetings with the relevant parties. Technically, our Internal Security Forces have significant experience, they have the opportunity to reach many regions, but our means are limited in terms of controlling what is leaked, detecting existing phones and tracking them.
As part of the investigation launched after the attack, leaked phones, cards and partial ammunition were discovered. Most of the ammunition used in the attack was imported. However, there was some ammunition inside. The issues of how they were brought, of course, were revealed in the investigation. Necessary measures were taken and an account was demanded. But our possibilities are limited in this regard. Prison security who were in contact with these detainees received training, but it was limited training. The experience of our defense forces in this regard is not at a high level. For the first time, we have received such a large number of detainees in the period after 2019. We had to take the necessary measures in a short time. For this reason, its shortcomings were also revealed in this respect.
Didn’t the anti-ISIS international forces in the region help in this regard?
Necessary measures were taken in line with the information shared by the forces in the region, especially the intelligence organizations we worked with at this prison point. However, this was not enough. On the other hand, as we have mentioned before, the limited resources available to our forces caused this attack and its consequences. We know many things, we say we will do it, but we cannot do it because of the possibilities we have. We have voiced this many times and asked for help. The burden of ISIS detainees is not a burden to be left only to the SDF and the Autonomous Administration. It is a heavy burden.
This attack was a very dangerous plan. If it had happened as planned, a ‘caliphate’ could have been declared once more for both the prison and the camp. This was very dangerous for the whole region. In fact, it was very dangerous for the whole world. It also had an international approach aspect. Everyone said, ‘Now ISIS is over, it is under the control of the SDF. He was protecting us, he said, withdrawing himself. The support and assistance needed was very limited. There was no serious approach appropriate to the process to develop. We have said this many times. It’s like we just say or use it. The Turkish state and many others also say this. However, we believe that after the attack, everyone will approach it with this seriousness.
You said that the building where the attack took place was not suitable for a prison. What kind of building do the detainees stay in right now? Have all necessary precautions been taken against a new attack?
After these attacks, the detained ISIS members were transferred to the newly built prison. However, measures in this regard are few. A solid prison building is not enough either. There are many examples of how detainees escaped, even in high-security prisons in many countries. A solid building alone is not enough. However, this is also difficult if many necessary precautions are not taken. The most dangerous thing is to leave these ISIS members like this. We’ve stated it before. The imprisoned ISIS members are hoping to get out of this situation and to ‘establish the caliphate’ again. Especially our possibilities are known. They should be prosecuted and everyone should remove this responsibility. Let’s take the necessary measures together. Strong work is needed on this.
Does just making prisons safe solve this problem? What is needed for a radical solution?
Now it has been a year since this attack. However, opportunities and support are still weak. Even in terms of food, drink and necessary medicines, everything is a big problem. All are problems. Leaving all of this with the Northern and Eastern Syria Autonomous Administration and the SDF is not legally correct, nor in other respects. More than 50 countries have detainees. Although some want to take it, this is a very limited number. Some countries have stepped in, some countries do not even mention it. It’s like they don’t exist. Even after this attack, he did not show the necessary approach. Some countries said they would strip them of citizenship. No further step has been taken.
Some measures have been taken with our own means and partial assistance from the Coalition. However, we have some weaknesses as revealed in these issues and investigations. There is still little support, especially in terms of our forces providing intelligence and prison security. Not only this prison, there are many other prisons in the region. A partial number of detainees are in this area. There are such prisons in the region where mostly dangerous ISIS members stay. There are also information and dangers to these places.
THEY ARE ORGANIZED INSIDE
These places require very broad and long-term plans. There are some measures we have taken within our means. Because now, once again, there is information about attacks on the region, including prisons. Their senior management has fought and led the war here for years, they have experience, they know that they have leaders who are thinking about new plans in prison for all these years. During the operations to the prisons, some materials that organized themselves were seized. In prisons, they are constantly getting ready. They say this themselves. They say they are waiting for the day they will go out.
Because nothing has been done against them. There is no penalty given. There is no one to protect them. They have hope for this. This is dangerous. Now there are plans. They want to reach them. Because the most essential leaders and staff are in these prisons. There are initiatives and efforts for this, and they continue. There are measures we have taken in this regard. Our forces are taking security measures in these places. The latest attack on Raqqa is also a part of it. Again, many regions have such information. For this, a stronger movement is needed in this regard. Stronger support and help is needed. Everyone should take action and fulfill their responsibilities.
Do you have anything to add regarding the investigation carried out?
We conducted an investigation to the best of our abilities. There are still aspects to consider. There are still aspects that we cannot clarify. Because there were phone numbers belonging to Turkey and many other countries. Whoever they belonged to, they should have been followed. Our ability to detect them is limited. We shared this with other forces. There are no desired results. Again, who were the murdered people, DNA tests were required for them. We have few opportunities in the region. That’s why we still can’t say anything clear about some issues. Bui doesn’t mean we don’t dwell on it. The investigation is still ongoing.
The seized things, once again the ISIS members we arrested; they are being questioned. Our work still continues. It is still on our agenda. We’re trying to uncover the scarce areas. We have reached rough conclusions, but there are still some details and we continue to work on this issue.
